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approach nonparametrically estimates inefficiency by 
comparing actual performance with comparable real-
life “best practice” on the frontier and could be useful 
in exercises aimed at improving provider performance. 
Four applications in the education and health sectors are 
used to illustrate the features and strengths of this hybrid 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we propose a new approach to measuring efficiency, and illustrate it with 
four applications in the education and health sectors. The paper is motivated by three interrelated 
ideas.  The  first  is  that  inefficiency  is  commonplace,  especially  in  the  education  and  health 
sectors, but is not ubiquitous—some providers, some local governments, and some countries, are 
more efficient than others. The second idea is that having data comparing actual performance to 
„best practice‟ could be useful in exercises aimed at improving provider performance. These 
might  involve  users  holding  providers  accountable  directly  through,  for  example,  voucher 
schemes. Or they might involve citizens  holding politicians accountable for service delivery 
inefficiencies through the political  process,  and  policymakers then holding service providers 
accountable  through,  for  example,  payment  mechanisms  that  reward  good  performance  or 
„naming-and-shaming‟ exercises where poor performance is publicized. The third idea behind 
the  paper  is  that  an  observation  that  efforts  to  date  to  measure  inefficiency  and  use  it  in 
benchmarking exercises have not  been altogether satisfactory. Some efforts  focus  simply on 
outputs  or  outcomes  without  factoring  in  the  expenditures  involved  (there  has  been  much 
discussion, for example, about the cross-country variation in education test scores; but it may be 
the case that the high achievers simply spend more), while studies that have sought to measure 
efficiency have not apparently had much impact among policymakers (cf. e.g. Burgess 2006; 
Hollingsworth and Street 2006); we feel this lack of impact derives from skepticism over the 
methods.  
The method we propose and illustrate in this paper blends themes from the two efficiency 
measurement  methodologies  used  to  date,  namely  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  and 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
1 DEA usually focuses on estimating technical inefficiency 
and constructs an isoquant frontier made up of a set of piecewise linear segments joining a few 
data points in the input space. The frontier envelopes the data and permits the comparison of  a 
real-life unit to a hypothetical comparator on the piecewise linear segment of the isoquant with 
the same input proportions. SFA, on the other hand, estimates the production or cost frontier 
                                                 
1  For  recent  surveys  of  DEA  and  SFA  in  education  and  health,  see  Worthington  (2001)  and  Hollingsworth  (2008).  Early 
published applications of SFA in education and health include Deller and Rudnicki (1993) and Wagstaff (1989) respectively. 
Early published applications of DEA in education and health include Bessent and Bessent (1980), Ray (1991), Sherman (1984), 
and Huang and Mclaughlin (1989).      3 
using  a  regression  model  with  specific  functional  form  and  distributional  assumptions.  The 
estimated frontier permits the comparison of actual output or spending to the corresponding point 
on the frontier to measure inefficiency. Both of these methods have pros and cons, and both 
share some weaknesses. Our approach tries to take the attractive features of each while trying to 
avoid their shared shortcomings.  
We borrow two ideas from DEA and two from SFA. We focus on overall efficiency—
this is straightforward in SFA but not typically done in DEA where the focus is on technical 
inefficiency.
2 We think policymakers will typically want to look at  overall inefficiency not just 
technical inefficiency.  On the other hand, our approach is more similar to DEA in that it 
envelopes the data through the use of nonparametric methods. This gets round the criticism of 
SFA that its results are dependent on the functional form assumed, and  allows for  multiple 
efficient units; in contrast,  SFA typically produces  at most a few efficient units and quite 
possibly just one—this will almost certainly to be the case in the classic panel-data formulation 
where inefficiency is modeled as a time-invariant fixed effect (Schmidt and Sickles 1984). Our 
approach imposes fewer assumptions than DEA, however: DEA imposes assumptions about the 
shape of isoquants, but we impose no assumptions about the cost curve. Finally, our approach is 
closer to SFA in that we make some allowance for statistical noise and measurement error. In its 
traditional and commonest form DEA does not allow for measurement error or statistical noise.
3 
SFA, by contrast, does allow for noise and measurement error, but this comes at the expense of 
an arbitrary and untestable assumption that enables inefficiency to be distinguished from random 
shocks and measurement error.  
In addition to borrowing the attractive features of  DEA and SFA, we also try to avoid 
their shared weaknesses. Both assess the efficiency of a unit by comparing the unit‟s output or 
spending to that of a hypothetical unit rather than that of a real-life one. This use of hypothetical 
comparators makes the exercise untransparent to a policymaker and introduces a large element of 
„make believe‟. A policymaker in an inefficient country, or the head of an inefficient school 
board,  can  quite  reasonably  dismiss  claims  of  inefficiency  when  the  comparison  is  with  a 
fictitious unit. And even if the policymaker or head of school district is keen to learn how to 
improve their performance, there is no better-performing country or better-performing school 
                                                 
2 Allocative inefficiency can be estimated in a DEA, but has to be done explicitly, and the analyst needs to have input prices for 
all the inputs (Coelli 1996). 
3  Recent advances in DEA research have introduced bootstrapping in DEA to get around this (see Simar and Wilson 2000).      4 
district  to  visit.  In  our  approach,  by  contrast,  inefficient  units  are  compared  with  real-life 
efficient units.  We can  tell  a policymaker of  an inefficient  government  or a manager of  an 
inefficient delivery unit which real-life country or unit achieves similar outcomes at a lower cost.  
The  second  common  shortcoming  of  DEA  and  SFA  we  try  to  address  is  their 
vulnerability  to  special  pleading—policymakers  or  managers  of  poorly  performing  service 
delivery units claiming that there are legitimate factors explaining their poor performance that 
are ignored by the analysis. The usual response to date in the DEA and SFA literatures has been 
to  address  this  issue  through  a  two-stage  approach:  (1)  construct  or  estimate  a  frontier  to 
calculate  efficiency  scores;  and  (2)  regress  efficiency  scores  on  factors  thought  to  influence 
them. This practice has been criticized, not least because the process by which the efficiency 
scores is generated is ignored in the second-stage regression exercise (Burgess 2006). Instead, 
we build exogenous constraints into our analysis and allow different groups of units to have 
different frontiers. This multiple-frontier approach could, of course, be used in DEA and SFA 
studies too.  
We illustrate our approach throughout using examples from the education and health 
sectors. Our examples are chosen with a view to data quality and variety in terms of level of 
decision-making. In both education and health, there is growing realization of the need to look 
beyond the number of people passing through a facility to the difference that the facility makes 
to the lives of the people passing through it. In the two education examples, therefore, we look at 
test scores to get at the quality of the education process rather than at student numbers which 
capture just quantity. One example comes from the level of the local government: our data come 
from California where school districts control the day-to-day running of public schools. The 
other education example relates to national education systems and makes use of data from the 
OECD‟s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study; while undertaken by the 
OECD, the geographic coverage of the study now extends well beyond the OECD countries. Our 
first health example also uses national data and tries to get at the efficiency of health systems. 
Looking at patients treated misses the quality of care, and in any case one could argue that if a 
health system is successful at preventing illness and injuries it ought to be reducing the number 
of patients requiring treatment. Measures of population health tend to be too broad-brush to be 
compelling measures of the outcome of a health system: many are affected by factors beyond the 
health  system,  and  many  causes  of  death  are  not  amenable  to  medical  care  at  all  or  only      5 
marginally so.  We therefore focus  on a limited set  of causes  of death that are  amenable to 
medical care, and on deaths among people under the age of 70 where for the selected conditions 
medical care can make a large difference. The data we use are currently available only for OECD 
countries. Our final example is at the facility level and concerns hospitals. A large fraction of 
health spending goes on hospitals, and many efficiency-enhancing efforts are directed at the 
hospital sector. Our data come from Vietnam, which though only a low-income country has 
unusually good data on its hospital sector by developing country standards. The data are not 
without their shortcomings, however, and this analysis especially is intended to be illustrative; 
with richer data on, for example, disease codes, one could do a more sophisticated efficiency 
analysis.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  introduces  our  empirical 
examples. Section III introduces and illustrates our hybrid approach to efficiency measurement 
in the simple case of a single output. Briefly, we identify efficient units through a grid-search 
process,  identifying  the  least-cost  unit  over  each  output  range,  and  then  estimate  a  frontier 
nonparametrically  using  the  output-expenditure  combinations  of  the  efficient  units.  We  then 
measure the inefficiency of the inefficient units by comparing the inefficient unit‟s spending with 
the spending of the closest efficient unit on the frontier. We compare our results with those 
emerging  from  the  panel-data  stochastic  frontier  model.  We  obtain  smaller  estimates  of 
efficiency using our hybrid approach, reflecting the fact that our frontier consists of real-life not 
hypothetical  units.  Section  III  extends  the  method  to  allow  for  multiple  outputs  or  multiple 
dimensions of quality. We now identify efficient units over ranges across multiple dimensions—
in the two-output case, for example, our grid search is over a square rather than a line segment. 
We compare empirically for each of our four examples the single- and multiple-output results. In 
three of the four examples, allowing for multiple outputs makes a large difference. Section IV 
extends the analysis further to allow for exogenous factors that constrain a unit from reaching the 
frontier. We illustrate our approach of different groups of units having different frontiers on the 
California schools dataset, using poverty as the stratifying variable. By constructing separate 
frontiers for school districts with small and large fractions of poor children, we allow for the 
possibility that the latter are constrained to making do with a lower level of „home inputs‟ in the 
production of schooling outcomes. It turns out that allowing for separate frontiers makes less of a      6 
difference in this example than we had expected—less than allowing for multiple dimensions of 
quality, for example.  
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO OUR EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
As we illustrate the methods through examples, it makes sense to introduce our examples 
ahead of the methods. As previously indicated, we have four examples—two from the education 
sector, and two from the health sector.  Table 1 provides an overview  of the  four empirical 
applications, along with basic descriptive statistics.  
Schools—California  
It is often noted that California‟s school system spends relatively little per pupil by US 
standards, and that its students fare worse than the US national average on test scores.
4 What is 
less frequently mentioned is the large variation across California school districts in spending and 
test scores; this latter variation likely reflects the fact that the day-to-day running of California‟s 
public schools is the responsibility of school districts. A recent newspaper article by Freedberg 
and  Doig  (2011),  investigative  reporters  with  the  Center  for  Investigative  Reporting,  drew 
attention to the large variations around the 2010 mean of $8,452 (the Pacific Unified School 
District  spent  nearly  $60,000  per  pupil),  and  noted  that  there  is  no  perceptible  relationship 
between spending and test scores. It is this intra-state variation we focus on, trying to determine 
which school districts are—by California‟s standards—efficient, and how inefficient each of the 
inefficient ones is.  
The literature to date on the costs of California‟s schools has taken a somewhat different 
tack from ours. Imazeki (2006) estimates cost functions, allowing the structure to vary according 
to the concentration of schools in the school district and the fraction of pupils eligible for free or 
subsidized  meals.  No  explicit  allowance  is  made  for  inefficiency;  for  example,  frontier 
techniques are not employed. Costrell et al. (2008) have expressed misgivings about the analysis, 
arguing inter alia that the results make no adequate allowance for or fail to uncover unobserved 
factors such as efficiency differences between school districts. Chambers et al. (Chambers et al. 
                                                 
4  See, for example, The Economist April 20 2011 “A lesson in mediocrity: California‟s schools show how direct democracy can 
destroy accountability”.       7 
2006) use a panel of professional educators to assess the minimum spending necessary to deliver 
instructional programs for schools of varying size and demographic composition and conclude 
that California‟s schools underspend. They conclude that only 15 to 28 of the 984 school districts 
examined were spending at the level adequate to reach California‟s content and performance 
standards in all major subjects. The authors estimated that an additional $24.14 to $32.01 billion 
would have been necessary in the 2004/2005 school year to ensure the opportunity of all students 
to reach the state‟s content and performance standards. This approach begs the question of why 
some school districts appear to achieve much better results with similar levels of spending per 
pupil, and why some spend considerably more than other and yet achieve no better results. 
We  sourced  school  districts‟  educational  outcomes  and  expenditure  data  from  the 
California  Department  of  Education‟s  website.
5  Each  year,  the  California  Department  of 
Education collects and reports information about student test scores in California Standards Tests 
(CST), current expense of education, enrolment, number of dropouts, number of graduates, and 
enrolment  of  English  learners  of  roughly  980  local  educational  agencies  (LEA)  or  school 
districts in California. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on 313 of the school districts 
that  control  both  elementary  and  high  school  levels  (i.e.,  unified  school  districts)  within  its 
boundary and have data on CST scaled scores for math and reading in grade 5 and grade 7, 
current expenditures, enrolment, and poverty estimates consistently available between 2003/2004 
and 2008/2009 academic years.
6 Californian students attending grade 2 to grade 11 take the CST 
in  mathematics,  rea ding,  science,  history,  social  science,  and  so  on.  Some  students  with 
disabilities take the California Alternative Performance Assessment (CAPA) and their test scores 
are excluded from our sample. However, students in grade 8 and beyond tend to take differ ent 
CST depending on their course selection in school. We chose to focus on math and reading 
achievement in grade 5 and grade 7, so we have a manageable number of test outcomes that 
correspond to elementary school level and secondary school level.  
International education systems—PISA  
Much has been written about the international variation in knowledge and skills emerging 
from exercises such as the OECD‟s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) that 
                                                 
5 The website is http://www.cde.ca.gov. The current expenditure data are adjusted to June 2000 dollar values based on the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics website ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.  
6 14 of these school districts have some test score or enrollment data missing in some years because of their relatively small size.      8 
assesses 15-year-old students in grade seven or higher every three years.
7 Four of the five top 
places in the 2010 report in both reading and mathematics went to Asian countries: China 
(Shanghai and Hong Kong SAR, China), S Korea, and Singapore. By contrast, the US ranked 
11
th on reading and 26
th on mathematics. Discussions of these results, such as OECD (2010), 
typically  focus  simply  on  scores,  without  factoring  in  the  amounts  that  countries  spend  on 
education. It is perfectly possible in principle that the countries achieving the best outcomes are 
those that spend the most, and that those who do less well spend relatively little. The more 
interesting—but rarely asked—question from a policy perspective is how countries vary in their 
success at translating resources into learning outcomes.
8 
We explore this issue using data on knowledge and skills in mathematics, reading and 
science from the PISA exercise, and secondary education spending data from the World Bank‟s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). We have an unbalanced panel comprising 118 sets of test 
scores and secondary education expenditure per pupil for 49 countries for some or all the years 
2000, 2003 and 2006.
9 Because information about expenditure per student is missing in the WDI 
for some countries in some years, 25 of the 118 observations are  interpolated or extrapolated. 
Although in each assessment of PISA, one of the three areas (science, reading and mathematics) 
is selected as the major domain and is given greater emphasis, while the two minor domains are 
assessed less thoroughly, differences in test scores across countries and over time are comparable 
because the tests are linked assessments and the scores are scaled.
10 
International health systems—OECD  
It is well known that countries vary considerably in their per capita spending on health 
care, with the US being among the largest spenders per capita. Inevitably, there has been and 
continues to be a lot of debate on the question of whether the high spenders (especially the US) 
achieve sufficiently better results to warrant the extra spending (cf. e.g. Anderson and Frogner 
2008), and more generally on how to measure health sector results in international comparisons 
                                                 
7 See http://www.pisa.oecd.org/ for further details of the PISA program. For studies examining the cross-country differences in 
PISA, see Dobert, Klieme, and Sroka (2004), Ammermueller (2007), and Fuchs and Woessmann (2007). 
8 Afonso and St Aubyn (2005) is an exception. They use DEA to analyze efficiency in education spending in OECD countries 
using the PISA data.  
9 We have not included data for 2009 because most countries do not have expenditure data available in the WDI database.  The 
secondary education expenditure per student is generated by multiplying purchasing power parity GDP per capita (2005 constant 
value) with expenditure per student in secondary education as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
10 See PISA 2003 Technical Report (Adams 2005) for details.      9 
of health system performance (see e.g. Hakkinen and Joumard 2007). Throughput measures—
such as inpatient admissions, and ambulatory care visits—are just that, and need not necessarily 
capture the ultimate outcome of interest, namely better health. But health indicators such as 
mortality (or life expectancy) and disability reflect many factors beyond the control of the health 
sector:  deaths  from road accidents  likely reflect  road safety improvements  more than health 
spending, and many deaths are from causes that are still not amenable to medical intervention. 
Arguably  a  more  compelling  approach  when  assessing  the  efficiency  of  a  country‟s  health 
spending is to link health spending to deaths from conditions that are amenable to medical care 
(Nolte and McKee 2008). This is what we do in this study.  
Our data come from the OECD‟s Health Data. We have data for 29 countries over the 
period 1960-2005. Not all countries have data for every year. Health spending is defined as total 
health  spending  (i.e.  public  plus  private)  measured  in  2000  prices  in  international  dollars. 
Mortality is measured through potential years of life lost (PYLL) among people below the age of 
70 who die from nine causes of death that are „amenable‟ to medical care, i.e. causes where 
timely and effective medical care can result in a death being avoided. We select the conditions 
from Nolte and McKee (2008) who identify a longer list of conditions but only nine are included 
in the OECD PYLL database. Deaths among older age groups are excluded by the OECD on the 
grounds that they are less easily amenable to medical care. We aggregate some of the conditions 
so we are left with a more manageable six PYLL „outputs‟.
11 Our measure of health sector 
output—while preferable to a throughput measure and better than all-cause mortality among all 
age groups—is not without its limitations, of course. It focuses on length of life rather than 
quality of life and does  not  capture success  in reducing mortality among the over-70s  from 
conditions that are amenable to medical care. Countries that disproportionately target spending at 
the over-70s, or at patients whose length of life cannot be extended but whose quality of life can 
be improved will appear in our analysis as inefficient.  
Hospitals—Vietnam  
Hospitals absorb the bulk of health spending in most countries, and there has been much 
discussion  of  the  scope  for  lowering  health  spending  by  reducing  their  inefficiency. 
                                                 
11 We aggregated PYLL‟s from three types of cancer (colon, breast and cervical) into an aggregate cancer PYLL, and aggregated 
PYLL‟s from pregnancies/deliveries and perinatal causes into an aggregate maternal and child health (MCH)) PYLL. The 
remaining four amenable causes were diabetes, ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, and influenza/pneumonia.       10 
Unsurprisingly some of the first applications of DEA and SFA in health were on the hospital 
sector  (e.g.,  (Wagstaff  1989)  and  (Ray  1991)),  and  there  has  been  a  good  deal  of  work 
undertaken since then: EconLit contains 56 publications with “hospital” and “frontier” in the 
abstract). According to Hollingsworth and Street (2006), however, this work has had a relatively 
modest impact on policymakers. 
Our data are from Vietnam‟s official public hospital inventory, the same dataset used by 
Weaver and Deolalikar (2004) in their study of economies of scale and scope in Vietnamese 
hospitals.  By  the  standards  of  low-  and  middle-income  countries,  this  is  an  unusually  good 
dataset.  However,  it  does  lack  detailed  information  on  patients  treated,  distinguishing  only 
between inpatients, surgery cases  and outpatients  and  not  between different  departments, let 
alone different diseases and treatments. In what follows we have included only district hospitals 
that have between 50 and 500 beds. We have excluded central hospitals run directly by the health 
ministry, and level-1 and level-2 hospitals (more complex hospitals). Our sample consists of 795 
hospitals.  Our  data  are  for  three  years:  1998,  1999  and  2000.  The  expenditure  data  cover 
recurrent costs.  
III. THE SINGLE OUTPUT CASE  
We start with the simplest case, where we have just one output, or one dimension of 
quality. (We allow for multiple outputs in the next section.)   
Methods  
We assume labor and nonlabor inputs are combined to produce an output y at a cost C. 
Costs  can  exceed  their  feasible  minimum  because  the  input  bundle  used  does  not  yield  the 
maximum  possible  output  (technical  inefficiency),  or  because  inputs  are  used  in  the  wrong 
proportions given their prices and marginal products (allocative inefficiency), or both. We do not 
try to disentangle the two, instead presenting an estimate of overall inefficiency.  
Suppose  we  have  data  from  multiple  service-delivery  units.  We  can  then  generate  a 
scatterplot of C (or average cost) against y—the space of the standard total (or average) cost 
curve chart in a microeconomics textbook. In services like education and health, it is important      11 
to allow for quality and not just focus on „outputs‟ such as enrollments or cases treated. We can 
allow for quality by graphing average cost per person, C/y, against quality, q. For example, y 
might be students enrolled, C/y cost per student, and q the average test score.
12  
In the first stage of our analysis, we identify a group of  efficient service delivery units 
(or, in the case of panel data, efficient service delivery units at a point in time), defined as those 
that have the smallest (total or average) expenditure for each level of output, or the smallest 
expenditure  per  student  or  patient  treated  for  each  level  of  quality.  Because  there  will  be 
relatively few units that have  exactly the same output (or quality), we work with output (or 
quality) ranges. We define a caliper of size c, and move the caliper along the y (or q) axis in 
steps of size s≤c. In this case where y (or q) is a scalar, the caliper is a line of length c which gets 
moved up the y (or q) axis up to the maximum value of the outcome in steps of s. In each step, 
the unit with the smallest expenditure within the caliper is identified and labeled an „efficient 
unit‟.  Next  we  create  a  (stochastic)  frontier  by  running  a  nonparametric  Lowess  smoother 
through the datapoints of these efficient units, and defining the frontier as the predicted cost for 
each efficient unit. The grid-search process thus identifies efficient units, and the smoothing 
process produces the frontier, with all efficient units being moved to the frontier.  
In the second stage, we compute the inefficiency of inefficient delivery units by matching 
each unit off the frontier with the closest unit on the frontier in terms on the outcome y; the unit‟s 
inefficiency is the difference between its expenditure and the expenditure of the closest match on 
the frontier.
13 In contrast to  both DEA and SFA where units are compared with hypothetic al 
units, the matched unit for each inefficient unit in our approach is a real-life service delivery unit, 
not a hypothetical point on the frontier. We see this as a strength of our approach ; all are units 
that have actually managed to produce (close to) output y at a cost C, not ones that ought to have 
been capable of doing so.  
Two  points  are  worth  clarifying  at  this  stage.  First,  the  first  stage  may  leave  some 
inefficient units below the smoothed frontier. These are units that emerge with somewhat higher 
                                                 
12 For such a graph to be justified, the underlying two-product cost function would have to have the form C(y,q) = y∙c(q), giving 
C(y,q)/y = c(q). Crampes and Hollander (1995) use such a cost function, but do not explore its properties. For the most part, the 
properties are fairly innocuous. The extent of ray economies (the effect on cost of doubling both y and q) depends on the shape of 
c(q), with c'(q)>0 implying ray diseconomies and c'(q)<0 implying ray diseconomies. There are economies of scale with respect 
to quality if c'(q)<c(q). The only odd feature of the cost function is that it implies that average incremental costs for quantity 
always exceeds the marginal cost for quantity.  
13 We use the Stata module PSMATCH2 (Leuven and Sianesi 2003) to do the matching.       12 
costs than the least-cost unit over a specific output range. Because the latter have their actual cost 
replaced by the predicted cost from the smoother, some units will be moved up to the frontier, 
and hence may find themselves with „expected‟ costs that are higher than the actual costs of 
inefficient units, albeit ones that have costs that are close to the frontier costs. We reclassify such 
units as efficient units ex post, by setting their inefficiency scores to zero in the second stage. 
Second, our frontier is inevitably dependent on the size of the caliper c and the step s, as well as 
potentially the bandwidth of the Lowess smoother. Our empirical analysis therefore inevitably 
entails some sensitivity analysis to see how sensitive inefficiency scores (and the rankings of 
service delivery units) are to the choices of c and s.
14  
The use of the Lowess smoother allows for a flexible representation of the frontier, while 
the grid search ensures that for each output (or quality) range we base the frontier on a real -life 
unit. Our approach blends themes from DEA and SFA. Like DEA, our approach identifies 
efficient units through an envelopment process using a subset of  datapoints; this contrast with 
SFA which uses all datapoints to establish the frontier. Of course, we work in a different space 
from DEA, which operates in input space. The fact that we replace actual costs with predicted 
costs is reminiscent of SFA; our use of a smoother accepts that there i s some randomness 
associated with realized costs at each output level. Insofar as we have repeated observations over 
time on a given service -delivery unit (in our empirical examples we do), we can average 
inefficiency scores over time to allow for randomness in the realized expenditures of inefficient 
units. Unlike SFA we make no assumption about the functional form of the cost function, and we 
use only a subset of datapoints to arrive at the frontier.  
Empirical examples  
Figure 1 illustrates the idea in each of our four cases. The first three allow for quality by 
graphing expenditure per person against a quality measure—test scores in the two education 
examples, and in the case of national health systems the aggregated potential years of life lost 
occurring before the age of 70 through deaths from six causes amenable to medical care. The 
large dots correspond to units that emerge as efficient in our grid search, while the smaller dots 
correspond to the units that do not emerge as efficient through this process. The hybrid frontier 
in each example is constructed by passing a Lowess smoother through the efficient points.  
                                                 
14 We do not report results for different bandwidths of the Lowess smoother.       13 
The charts illustrate the need to  look  at  both  spending  and outcomes,  particularly in 
education where for the most part higher quality entails on average higher spending per pupil. 
The PISA data reveal, for example, that Uruguay fares relatively badly in terms of test scores, 
but also spends relatively little; in fact, it ends up on our frontier. Sweden, by contrast, does 
much better in terms of test scores, but spends considerably more and ends up some way above 
our  frontier.  Finland  does  well  both  in  terms  of  its  test  score  results  and  its  efficiency  in 
translating resources into outcomes; it ends up on or close to the frontier depending on the year.  
Figure 2 shows the least efficient units in each of the four studies. These are all units that 
achieve similar outcomes to other units but at a considerably higher cost. Interestingly six of the 
seven least efficient countries in the education rankings are among the least efficient seven in the 
health system rankings. For the California schools example, the majority of the least efficient 
school districts listed, such as Shoreline Unified and San Pasqual Valley Unified, tend to be tiny 
districts located in sparsely populated remote areas, a feature similar to the Pacific Unified that 
Freedberg and Doig (2011) noted. 
Figure 3 compares our hybrid approach with the stochastic frontier model (SFM) where 
inefficiency is assumed to be half-normal and time-invariant (in all four examples, we have panel 
data) and the relationship between expenditure and output or quality is assumed to be double 
logarithmic. (Interestingly, in all these applications the cross-section SFM concluded that there 
was no cross-sample variation in inefficiency.) The charts show the hybrid frontier and the actual 
expenditure-output  combinations  along  with  the  deterministic  section  of  the  SFM  and  the 
efficient  expenditure  levels  emerging  from  the  SFM.  These  differ  from  the  expenditure 
corresponding to the deterministic section of the frontier because the SFM approach allows for 
statistical noise and random shocks. In each example, the deterministic section of the SFM and 
most of the efficient spending levels lie well below our hybrid frontier. The SFM typically finds 
one or at most a few units to be efficient; the inefficiency components of the residuals of the rest 
are adjusted accordingly. By contrast, in our approach, we find an efficient unit for each output 
range.  The  fact  that  the  SFM  imposes  a  specific  functional  form  also  results  in  differences 
between the efficiency scores emerging from the two approaches; these are particularly large in 
the case of the California schools example, but are also evident in the PISA and OECD examples 
particularly at the upper quality levels. Of course a different functional form in the SFM could      14 
reduce these discrepancies, but the nonparametric element in our hybrid approach avoids the 
need to take decisions about the functional form of the deterministic component of the SFM.  
The first column Table 2 for each example shows the estimated mean inefficiency in each 
of  the  four  exercises  for  our  hybrid  approach.  Also  reported  are  standard  errors  for  these 
estimates. These are not the standard errors produced through the matching routine, since this 
does not take into account the fact that the frontier is itself subject to sampling variability. Rather 
we obtain the standard errors in Table 2 through bootstrapping. We bootstrap the entire process: 
the grid search for efficient units; the Lowess smoothing to obtain the frontier; and finally the 
matching of inefficient to efficient units to measure inefficiency. Also reported are the calipers 
and steps, and the number and fraction of datapoints on the frontier. Inevitably in all efficiency 
measurement exercises, the inefficiency estimates depend on the sample. The higher inefficiency 
estimates in the PISA exercise than in the health system exercise reflects the fact the PISA 
exercise, while undertaken by the OECD, includes some non-OECD countries, some of which 
spend less on education and achieve good test scores; these end up on the frontier, raising the 
average inefficiency compared to the health system exercise where these countries are absent 
from the dataset.  
How  sensitive  are  our  results  to  the  choice  of  caliper  and  step? We  explore  this  by 
varying the step and  caliper and seeing how the average inefficiency changes,  and how the 
ranking of service delivery units (in a given year) changes. Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the 
inefficiency estimates to the choice of caliper and step. As we raise the caliper, the number on 
the frontier falls, and average inefficiency increases. However, even for a small caliper, and 
hence  a  larger  number  of  frontier  units,  inefficiency  is  appreciable  in  all  four  examples. 
Changing the step for a given caliper has a smaller effect in the examples where we have a 
relatively  large  number  of  service  delivery  units  at  each  point  in  time—California  school 
districts, and Vietnamese hospitals. The surface in Figure 4 is much “choppier” for the two 
country-level  examples,  particularly  for  small  calipers.  Figure  5  shows  how  sensitive  the 
rankings of service delivery units are to the choice of caliper and step. We compare the rank for 
each caliper and step combination to the rank in the distribution underlying Table 2—our basic 
results. The rankings are remarkably robust to the choice of caliper and step; the most fragile 
rankings are the PISA results, where the rank correlations hover around 0.8. This reflects the 
small size of the dataset, and the considerable heterogeneity among the countries included.       15 
IV. MULTIPLE OUTPUTS AND MULTIPLE QUALITY DIMENSIONS  
In  many  applications,  we  may  want  to  allow  for  multiple  outputs,  or  for  multiple 
dimensions of quality. In the two education examples we have averaged tests scores in each area; 
in reality, it is likely that teaching mathematics and reading (say) may entail different costs. This 
is even more likely to be the case in the health systems example, where we have aggregated 
different „amenable‟ causes of death. In the hospital example, we have aggregated outpatient, 
inpatient,  and  surgery  cases;  in  reality  the  three  may  have  different  cost  structures.  In  this 
section, we  generalize our hybrid approach  to  efficiency measurement  to  allow for multiple 
outputs and multiple dimensions of quality.  
Methods  
Consider the two-output case. We have an output vector y containing two outputs, y1 and 
y2. In this case, the caliper becomes a square of length and width c, which gets moved in steps of 
s along both dimensions of the plane defined by the minimum and maximum values of the two 
outcomes.  Within  each  square,  we  identify  the  least-cost  unit;  a  multidimensional  Lowess 
smoother is then run through the vector (C,y1,y2) for the efficient units which creates the frontier 
surface. Each unit that is above the frontier surface has costs that exceed the lowest recorded in 
the output „square‟ in question. We then match these inefficient units to units on the frontier 
using the Mahalanobis  (1936)  metric;  our outputs  do not need to  be measured on the same 
metric.  This  two-stage  process  can  be  generalized  to  three  or  more  outputs.  Obviously  the 
process becomes more involved the more outputs that are included in the exercise.  
The approach can be generalized to handle cases where there are multiple dimensions to 
quality. For example, y might be students and we might want to explicitly allow for quality 
across two dimensions: q1 might be the average test score in Mathematics and q2 might be the 
average test score in Reading. In this case we have a three-dimensional chart of C/y against q1 
and q2. The approach to efficiency measurement proceeds as in the multiple-output case. This 
can be generalized to more than two dimensions of quality.       16 
Empirical examples  
In  each  of  the  four  examples,  we  re-estimated  the  inefficiency  scores  allowing  for 
multiple quality dimensions or multiple outputs. In the education examples, instead of averaging 
test scores across subjects we allowed for four quality dimensions in the California case and 
three in the PISA case. In the health systems example, we also allowed  for multiple quality 
dimensions, allowing for six separate amenable causes of mortality. In the hospital example, we 
allowed for three outputs, outpatient cases, inpatient cases and surgery cases.  
Figure 6 compares the distributions of inefficiency scores for the single- and multiple-
output exercises. In the education examples, the switch to multiple outputs/dimensions results in 
an appreciable leftward shift of the inefficiency distribution; many units that looked inefficient 
when outputs or quality are reduced to one dimension look less inefficient when we allow for 
different  cost  structures  across  different  outputs  or  quality  dimensions.  This  is  also  evident 
comparing the two columns in Table 2 for each study. In the California case, the shift is quite 
dramatic, reducing mean inefficiency from $3,997 to $1,931. The top two maps in Figure 9 show 
this graphically: the right-hand map, which allows for multiple outputs, is considerably lighter in 
shade than the left-hand one, which is based on average test scores across all subjects. Figure 7 
sheds light on how much reranking goes on in the move from the single-outcome to multiple-
outcome exercises. In the California case, the scatter plot is quite busy, implying a fair amount of 
reranking. The Vietnam scatter is much tidier.  
V. ALLOWING FOR EXOGENOUS CONSTRAINTS ON EFFICIENCY  
A common response from policymakers and managers when confronted with estimated 
efficiency scores from DEA and SFA is that the analyst has made no allowance for factors that 
are beyond the policymaker‟s or manager‟s control that  prevent them from operating on the 
frontier. A school may be operating in a catchment area with a very poor population and may not 
receive  additional  funding  to  compensate.  A  health  facility  may  be  operating  in  a  sparsely 
populated or topologically challenging area, making outreach difficult.  
In DEA and SFA, the response has typically been to „explain‟ inefficiency scores through 
regression  analysis  to  such  constraints  and other influences  on efficiency  that  are under the 
control of the decision-making unit, although surprisingly, such analysis does not, as one might      17 
expect, adjust the efficiency scores to take into account the effects of the exogenous constraints. 
This ex post regression approach has in any case been criticized on the grounds that it makes no 
allowance for the way the scores are generated (cf. e.g. Burgess 2006).  
Methods  
A more fundamental objection to the post-hoc analysis of the influence of exogenous 
constraints  on  efficiency  scores  is  that  such  constraints  ought  to  be  allowed  for  during  the 
computation of the efficiency scores. In our hybrid approach we do this by allowing different 
groups of units (defined in terms of constraints) to have different frontiers.
15 This allows for 
considerable flexibility—much more than would be obtained than by, for example, including a 
constraint variable in a stochastic frontier. Our approach allows the location and shape of the 
frontier to vary across the groups. For each group, having generated the frontier, we compute an 
inefficiency score relative to the relevant frontier.  
Empirical example 
We illustrate the idea of allowing for exogenous constraints using the California schools 
data. We stratify school districts by poverty, distinguishing between districts in the bottom half 
and top half of the poverty headcount distribution. The rationale is that pupils from more affluent 
families may face more favorable home environments than pupils from poor families: the time 
available  for  homework  may  be  greater;  the  degree  of  parental  input  and  oversight  may  be 
greater;  the  pupils  may  come  to  school  better  nourished;  and  so  on.  School  inputs  may  be 
comparable, but home inputs that are beyond the control of the school may be smaller in schools 
in poorer catchment areas.  
The school district estimates of school age students (aged 5 to 17) living in households 
under poverty were sourced from the U.S. Census Bureau‟s Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates  (SAIPE).
16  According  to  the U.S.  Censu s  Bureau‟s  website,  the  estimates  were 
computed  using  data  from  administrative  records,  intercensal  population  estimates,  and  the 
decennial census with direct estimates from the American Community Survey.  
                                                 
15 This principle could also be applied to other approaches to efficiency  measurement, of course. One could, for example, 
estimate separate stochastic frontiers for different groups.  
16 The data are available at http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/schools/index.html      18 
The top-left panel of Figure 8 imposes a single frontier but colors the low-poverty school 
districts lighter (in green) and the high-poverty ones darker (in red). The high-poverty districts 
have worse test scores in absolute terms and at a given level of spending. The top-right panel 
shows that a single frontier produces higher inefficiency estimates for the high-poverty districts 
than for the low-poverty districts. There is a prima facie case therefore that separate frontiers 
might be warranted. The bottom-left panel allows for different frontiers, with the frontier for the 
high-poverty districts being (mostly) similarly shaped but somewhat to the left of that of the low-
poverty districts. The bottom-right panel shows that separate frontiers yield a much more similar 
inefficiency distribution between the poor and less poor school districts than a single frontier.  
Comparing the top and bottom maps of each pair in Figure 9 shows graphically the effect 
on the inefficiency distribution of allowing poor and less poor districts to have different frontiers: 
both the one-output and multiple-output maps become lighter in shade as we move from the top 
where no allowance is made for poverty to the bottom where poor and less poor school districts 
are allowed to have separate frontiers. It is noteworthy, however, that the lightening of shade is 
less than is the case when one moves rightwards in Figure 9 from the single-output model to the 
multi-output model. The implication is allowing for different frontiers across different outputs is 
already sufficient to take into account the differing circumstances of the poorer and less poor 
school districts.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In  this  paper,  we  propose  a  hybrid  approach  to  measuring  efficiency  that  blends  the 
themes from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and 
illustrate  different  aspects  of  it  with  four  empirical  applications.  We  conclude  the  paper  by 
recapping  the  strengths  of  our  hybrid  approach,  summarizing  the  steps  to  be  followed  in 
implementing it, and highlighting the key aspects of the methods demonstrated in our empirical 
illustrations. 
Our approach has several strengths. First, it focuses on overall efficiency and does not 
require data on input prices. Second, the efficiency of a unit is assessed against a comparable 
real-life unit instead of some hypothetical comparators. Third, the approach is nonparametric, 
imposes few distributional and functional form assumptions, and allows for statistical noise in      19 
the process of constructing the frontier. Fourth, it can flexibly accounts for exogenous constraints 
that lead to poor performance. 
The major steps involve in the hybrid approach are: 
1.  Define the size of caliper and step; 
2.  Use a  grid search  with  a caliper and step to  identify  within each  grid  the  unit with  the 
smallest expenditure, and define as efficient the units identified through this process; 
3.  Create  a  stochastic  frontier  by  running  a  nonparametric  Lowess  smoother  through  the 
efficient units; 
4.  Replace actual expenditures with predicted expenditures for efficient units; 
5.  Match each inefficient unit with the closest efficient unit; 
6.  Compute inefficiency scores; 
7.  Replace inefficiency scores of inefficient units below the efficiency frontier to zeroes; 
8.  Vary the choice of caliper and step to assess the sensitivity of rankings. 
 
If exogenous constraints on efficiency are to be allowed, then the steps are: 
1.  Define several ranges of values within a constraint and create a cell corresponding to each 
range of values within a constraint; 
2.  Apply steps 1 to 8 above within each cell to generate inefficiency scores; 
3.  Undertake a sensitivity analysis of rank correlation with respect to choices of caliper and 
step. 
The empirical illustrations demonstrate several interesting aspects of the hybrid approach. 
First, we show that the hybrid approach envelopes the data better than SFA and produces smaller 
(and, we think, more realistic) inefficiency scores. Second, inefficiency scores tend to be lower 
in multiple-output cases than in single-output cases. Third, although the choice of caliper and 
step influences inefficiency scores, the rankings of inefficiency scores are remarkably robust, 
especially when the sample size of the dataset is relatively large. Finally, the California school 
districts example illustrates that allowing for exogenous constraints reduces inefficiency scores, 
though the reduction in inefficiency scores is larger by switching from the single-output case to 
the multiple-output case. 
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Table 1: Data for the four empirical illustrations 
 
  California school 
districts 
OECD Program for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA) 
OECD health systems   Vietnam district 
hospitals 
Sample coverage  313 unified school 
districts in 
California. 
49 countries.  29 OECD countries.  795 district 
hospitals in Vietnam 
with 50-500 beds.  
Time period  2003/04-2008/09  2000, 2003, 2006  1960-2005  1998, 1999, 2000 




expenditures in June 





at 2005 prices, per 
secondary pupil 
Total health spending 
in international dollars 
at 2000 prices, per 
capita  
Recurrent costs of 
hospital, per case 
Mean and standard 
deviations of 
expenditures  
9742.44 (2662.77)  5492.25 (3637.27)  1294.55 (891.70)  262.83 (158.36) 
Outcome measures  California Standards 
Test (CST) scores 
of grade 5 and grade 





Average PISA test 
scores in math, 
reading, and science 
of 15-year-old 
students in grade 7 
or higher. Averaged 
for one-outcome 
exercise. 
Potential years of life 
lost (PYLL) per 
100,000 population 
through deaths 
occurring before the 
age of 70 from six 
causes of death 
considered to be 
amenable to medical 





outcome exercise  
Outcome         
[mean; std. dev.] 








  Grade 5‟s reading 























  Average outcome 
[346.86; 24.50] 
  PYLL-cerebrovascular 
[228.62; 134.89] 
 
      PYLL-Flu/pneumonia 
[149.29; 178.54] 
 
      Aggregate outcome 
[1923.51; 924.54] 
 
Data sources  California 
Department of 
Education Data 
PISA and WDI 
Databases 




Table 2: Results from hybrid efficiency measurement method  
 
 
California school districts 
OECD Program for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA)  OECD health systems  Vietnam district hospitals 
 
Single  Multi-outcome  Single 
Multi-
outcome  Single 
Multi-
outcome  Single 
Multi-
outcome 
Inefficiency   3997  1931  2318  1721  868  1056  172  172 
t-stat   27.29  6.19  8.26  2.95  16.38  20.94  18.96  15.88 
Caliper  9.0  15.0  10.0  12.0  9.0  5.0  7.5  4.0 
Step  9.0  20.0  10.0  16.5  9.0  2.5  7.5  4.0 
No. of datapoints on frontier  66  67  25  19  44  50  66  65 
% on frontier  3.5%  3.6%  21.2%  16.0%  4.7%  5.3%  6.4%  6.3% 
Notes: t-stat is derived from the standard error obtained via bootstrapping with 250 replications. Actual caliper and step used are 1/100 of the values shown in the case of the single-
outcome exercise, and 1/10 of the value shown in the case of the multi-outcome exercise. The caliper and step are both defined in terms of standard deviation of the outcome variable. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of hybrid efficiency method  
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Figure 2: Least efficient units in the four examples  
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Figure 3: Comparison of hybrid and stochastic frontier methods  
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of single-output inefficiency estimates to choice of caliper and step  
 
   
Notes: Charts show average inefficiency score among non-frontier units obtained with caliper and step combination shown. Actual caliper and step used are 1/100 of the values shown. Caliper and step are defined in 
terms of standard deviation of the outcome variable.       27 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of single-output rankings to choice of caliper and step  
 
 
Notes: Charts show rank correlation between inefficiency score obtained with caliper and step combination shown, and inefficiency score with caliper and step combination used in basic analysis, as reported in Table 2. 
Actual caliper and step used are 1/100 of the values shown. Caliper and step are defined in terms of standard deviation of the outcome variable.       28 
Figure 6: Comparison of single- and multiple-output efficiency frequency distributions 
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Figure 7: Single- vs. multiple-output results  
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Figure 8: Allowing poverty rates to be an exogenous influence on California‟s school districts‟ efficiency  
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